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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did The District Court err when it found that 
the sentence imposed was authorized by statute? 
Did The District Court fail to follow the 
Laws of the state of Idaho? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant filed a Motion to correct an illegally 
imposed sentence pursuant to Idaho ~riminal court Rule 35. He 
Alleged that the District Court has imposed a sentence of 
imprisonment upon him and that the Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to impose that sentence. 
Furthermore, the Appellant is arguing that the District 
Court violated theFS.iJcth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and case precedent from the United States Supreme 
Court when it imposed a sentence that was more than provided for 
by statute and did not provide any basis for that sentence, 
nor was any factor that was used to impose that sentence, submitted 
to the Jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The crimes for which the Appellant has been sentenced both 
have a mandatory minimum term provided for within the Statute 
itself~ and therefore it is the second paragraph of the Unified 
Sentencing Act that should have been used when the sentence was 
pronounced upon the Appellant. 
However, the Court, at the time of the pronouncement of 
the sentence, used the first paragraph of the Unified Sentencing 
act, and has created an illegal sentence when doing so. 
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') 
IMPORTANT UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1). The Appel+ant stands convicted of two distinct and 
separate offenses. The first is the crime of Rape. The Second is 
the crime of Kidnaping in the 2nd degree. 
2). For the offense of 2nd degree Kidnaping, the Appell~nt 
was given a sentence of 25 years. The Court further ordered that 
all of the sentence was to be served as "fixed", or
1
determinate. 
3). For the Offense of Rape, the Appellant was given a 
sentence of "Fixed" life. This sentence was ordered to be served 
as concurrent to the sentence for the crime of Kidnaping. 
ILLEGALITY OF THE SENTENCE 
At the time a criminal defendant is arraigned, under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United states constitution, he has a right 
to be informed of the nature as to the crime charged. This would 
include being informed of any minimum and maximum sentences that 
could be imposed. 
This type of allocution serves many different purposes, 
including allowing the defendant to be informed of the consequences 
if he decides to proceed to trial. 
At the time the Appellant was arraigned he was informed 
that the maximum possible sentence that he was facing was a term 
of "LIFE". 
In the State of Idaho, when a defendant is sentenced to a 
term of "LIFE" he is eligible for parole after serving 10 years 
of his sentence. 
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At the time the sentence was pronounced upon thecAppellant 
he was given a term of "FIXED LIFE", which means that he will 
never be released from prison. 
It is based upon the fact that the sentence of "FIXED LIFE" 
is more than what is prescribed by statute for the offense as 
charged; and more than the maximum possible punishment as told 
to theAAppellant at his arraignment that he is alleging that 
his sentence is illegal. 
In the case of Apprendi v. New Jersy, 120 s.ct. 2348, 147 
L.Ed.2d 435, (2000), the United States Supreme Court held, 
" ••• any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt by being submitted 
to a jury". 
There is no doubt that the punishment for the crime of 
Rape can be a sentence of "LIFE". 
There is also no doubt that the sentence of "FIXED .. LIFE 11 
is a more severe punishment that the sentence of "LIFE". 
Because the sentence of the Appellant is a sentence of 
"FIXED LIFE", and because this sentence is more than what is 
provided for by statute, (The statute naming that the sentence 
may be a term of "LIFE"), it is submitted that because the 
sentence of "FIXED LIFE" was not presented to a jury and the facts 
that increased the sentence from "LIFE" to "FIXED LIFE", were 
not presented to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
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sentence is illegal as it violates the constitution of the 
United States. 
The Constitution requires that any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, ; 
(Other than the fact of a prior conviciton), must be submitted to 
a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Fifth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause, and the Sixth Amendment's Notice and jury 
trial guarantees require that any fact other than a prior 
conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be 
charged in the indictment, submitted to a jµry and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Please see, Jones V. United states,.526 U.S. 
227, 119 S.ct.1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311, (1999);; 
In the case before this Court, not even the ftppellant knows 
why he received a sentence of "FIXED LIFE". The Court did not make 
the additional findings of fact that are required to elevate the 
sentence from what is statutorily prescribed, ("LIFE"), to the 
sentence that the f.A.-ppellant received, ( "FIXED LIFE"). 
The Appellant was never given any type of notice that he 
was in jeopardy of receiving a sentence of "FIXED LIFE". At the 
time of arraignment· the Appellant was informed that he could 
receive a sentence of "LIFE''. (Which allows for parole eligibility 
after a certain amount of time). 
The State of "Idaho has recognized the difference between 
a sentence of "LIFE" and "FIXED LIFE". Please see, State V. Helms, 
143 Idaho 79, 137 P.3d 466, (2006); State V. Eubank, 114 Idaho 
635, 759 P.2d 926, (1988). 
Opening Brief of Appellant-4 
In those cases the Idaho State Supreme Court, and or the Idaho 
State Court of Appeals-found that in order to sentence a criminal 
defendant to a term of IIFIXED LIFE", the Court must find that a 
sentence of fixed life is reasonable because, 
· " •• the offense is so·egregious that it demands an 
exceptionally severe measure of retribution and 
deterrence, or if the offender is so utterly lacking in 
rehabilitation potential that imprisonment until 
death is the only feasible means of protecting 
society ••••• Unfortunately, in making these determinations 
a judge only has complete information in regard to 
deterrence and retribution, which are based upon the 
nature of the offense. The character of the offender 
is not completely known because it may evolve over 
time". Please see, State v. Eubank, Supra,. 
The Appellant herein declares that when the Court imposed a 
sentence of "FIXED LIFE" upon l::lim, it did so in contradiction to 
the case law from the upper Courts and also violated the United 
States Constitutional provisions as guaranteed to him under the 
Sixth Amendment. (The Notice requirement). 
A fixed life sentence based primarily upon an evaluation of 
character is acceptable only if the sentencing Court can determine 
with a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator can never be 
safely released into society. )?lease see, State v. Jackson, 130 
Idaho 293, 939 P.2d 1372, (1997). 
Because the Court did not make the necessary findings, i.e., 
that the Appellant could never be rehabilitated and that he 
could never be safely released into society; and or, that the 
crime the,,Appellant stands convicted of is more egregious than 
any other kidnap and Rape, for.which a "FIXED LIFE" term was not 
imposed, then the sentence is illegal and must be corrected. 
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"A District Court has no power or authority to impose a 
sentence in the absence of specific statutory authority to do 
so". State V. Nelson, 966 P.2d 133, (1998); State v. Hatfield, 
846 P.2d 1029, (1993); State V. Wilson, 926 P.2d 712, (1996). 
This means that a Court can only pronounce upon a criminal 
Defendant a sentence that is provided for by the Legislature 
in a specific Statute. That if;the sentence that is imposed is 
not directly found within legislative enactment, then that 
sentence is illegal. 
When the Idaho State Legislature enacted the Unified 
Sentencing Act, (Which is codified as §19-2513), it made very 
clear and direct reference to those crimes whereas there was or 
is a "Mandatory Minimum" term provided for within that particular 
statute. 
§19-2513, (In the Second Paragraph), states as follows: 
"If the statute carries a mandatory minimum penalty 
as provided for by Statute, the courttshall specify 
a minimum period of confinement consistent with such 
statute." ••••• 
As previously stated, the Appellant stands convicted of the 
offenses of Rape, and Kidnaping in the secoftd degree. The Offensse 
of Rape is punishable by a term of imprisonment of One, (1) year 
to life. (There is no mention of the term "fixed Life"). 
Clearly the one, (1), year term is a minimum mandatory term 
as mentioned in the Rape Statute. 
Kidnaping in the Second Degree is punishable by a term of 
imprisonment from Five, (5), years to life. Again, there is no 
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mention of a "Fixed Life" sentence. 
As this Court knows, if there is no Statutory authority to 
impose a particular sentence, then that sentence is not legal. 
Because the crimes for which the Appellant is being sentenced 
carries within the Statutory scheme for those crimes, a mandatory 
minimum period of confinement, it is clear that the Court is 
given it's authority to impose the sentence pursuant to the 
second paragraph of the unified sentencing act. 
The unified Sentencing Act, §19-2513, makes it clear that if 
there is a mandatory minimum period of confinement provided for 
in the Statute, then the Court SHALL specify a minimum period of 
confinement that is consistent with such statute. 
When the Court imposed a sentence of "Fixed Life" upon the 
Appellant, that is not consistent with the mandatory minimum 
period of confinement as mentioned in the statute for the offense 
of Rape. 
When the Court imposed a 25 year "fixed" term for the offense 
of Second Degree Kidnaping, that is not consistent with the 
minimum term as provided for in that statute. 
It is not some error that the Legislature did not specifically 
mention the term "fixed Life" in the above statutes. It is very 
clear that the Legislature does in fact recognize that a term of 
"Fixed Life" is more severe than a sentence of life. 
In the first degree homicide statute, the legislature made 
it very clear that a term of ''Fixed Life" can be imposed, but 
to do so there must be certain criteria present. If these are not 
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or if these aggravating factors are not found, then the sentence 
shall be "Life". 
It is the Idaho State Legislature itself who has used the 
term "Fixed Life" within the context of the First Degree Homicide 
Statute. Perhaps more importantly, when the Legislature uses the 
term "Fixed Life" it also makes it clear that a Jury must find 
the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. It also makes 
clear that a criminal defendant would have notice that his sentence 
might be a sentence of "fixed Life". 
In short, in order to impose a sentence of "fixed Life" for 
a charge of First Degree Homicide, the Court, (Or a Jury), must 
find aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It stands to no reason that for a lesser charge of Rape 
that the Court could impose a sentence of "Fixed Life" and never 
afford to the Defendant the same protections as those provided to 
a criminal defendant who is being sentenced for a charge of 
First degree Homicide. 
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that a term of 
"Fixed Life" is not authorized unless a Jury finds certain 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, if 
the term, "Fixed Life" is not within the specific statutory 
maximum term provided for by Statute, then such a term can not 
be legally imposed. 
The maximum term provided for, by statute, for the crimes 
the Appellant stands convicted of is "LIFE". Not "Fixed Life". 
The only crime the legislature has authorized a "fixed Life" 
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sentence for is the crime of first degree homicide, where the 
term "Fixed Life" is clearly provided for by statute. 
Because the crimes for which the Appellant has been sentenced 
carries within those statutes a mandatory minimum period of 
confinement, the Court, pursuant to §19-2513, second paragraph, 
must make the fixed term consistent with the mandatory minimum 
period of confinement as provided for within the statute in 
question. 
This leaves the Court to impose an "Indeterminate period" 
of up to life, but not a "Fixed Term 11 in that amount. 
Not all crimes in the State of Idaho carries a mandatory 
minimum period of confinement within the Statutes, and in those 
cases the Court has total discretion to "fix" the entire amount 
of the statutory maximum term. 
But, because that is not thesituation before this Court, this 
Court must follow the Statutory commands of the State of Idaho. 
11 The failure of a State to follow it's own statutory commands, 
may implicate a Due Process violation under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United states Constitution". Hicks V. 
Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 65 L.Ed. 2d 175, (1979); Fetterly V. 
Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295, (1993); Ballard V. Estelle, 
937 F.2d 453, (1991); Lambright V. Stewart, 167 F.3d 477, 
(1999). 
The statutory commands at issue in this case are the 
mandatory terms of §19-2513, second paragraph, whereas it is 
mandatory that if there is a minimum period of confinement in 
the statute, that the court must make the minimum term of the 
sentence to be consistent with that term. 
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When the sentencing court imposed a "Fixed Life" term 
for the offense of Rape, that is not a consistent term to the 
mandatory minimum term provided for in the Rape statute, and 
it is not authorized by the laws of the State of Idaho. 
The law does authorize a term of "Life", but does not 
allow this term to be fixed. It is to be an indeterminate term. 
The "fixed term 11 is to be consistent with the mandatory minimum 
provided for in the Statute. That is a One, (1), year term. The 
Court then is free to impose any amount of indeterminate 
sentence, up to, and including a term of life, but it does not 
have the authority to "fix" this term, as it is not provided for 
by Statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Court has imposed a sentence of "Fixed Life", 
and there is no type of statutory authority to impose such a 
term for the offense the Appellant is convicted of, it has 
sentenced the Appellant to a term that is not authorized by 
law. 
Because the crimes for which the Appellant is being 
sentenced, carry within those statutes a set mandatory minimum 
period of confinement, the Court, when imposing the sentence, 
was mandated to follow the commands of §19-2513, the second 
paragraph. 
Instead, when the Court imposed the sentence upon the 
Appellant, the Court used the first paragraph of §19-2513, 
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when it imposed the sentence upon the appellant, and under 
that paragraph the sentence imposed would have been legal if 
the crimes for which the Appellant was being sentenced did not 
have a set mandatory minimum period of confinement named in 
the statute for which the Appellant was being sentenced. 
Finally, because case law from the Idaho state Supreme 
Court clearly and conclusively depicts that a sentence of "Life" 
and a sentence of "Fixed Life" are not the same, (A sentence of 
Fixed Life being more severe), it is clear that in order to have 
imposed a sentence of "Fixed Life" upon the Appellant, he was 
entitled to the Due Process Protections of Apprendi V. New Jersey, 
Supra, and the beyond a reasonable doubt finding of In Re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 90 s.ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed. 2d 368, (1970). 
Even for the most serious crime of First Degree Murder, the 
Legislature has made it clear that to impose a sentence of 
"Fixed Life" there has to be special finds made by the Court, 
(If a Jury is waived), or by the Jury if the State seeks to 
impose the sentence of "Fixed Life". It is also a default type 
of sentence when the death penalty is sought but there are not 
enough aggravating factors found to impose the death penalty. 
In the above case, it is clearly named in the first degree 
murder statute, §18-4004, that a sentence of "Fixed Life" can 
be imposed after certain act~ons are done. 
Nowhere in the Statutory scheme of Rape or of second degree 
kidnaping is there a mention of a "fixed life" term, and therefore 
it is not authorized, and is an illegal sentence. 
Opening Brief of Appellant-11 
DECLARATION OF APPELLANT 
Comes now, the Appellant herein, who Declares under the 
United States Code, Title 28, Section 1746, that the enclosed 
Opening Brief of Appellant is true and correct to the best of 
his belief. 
(?(_,/ / 3 1/fl 
Appellant Dated 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Comes now, the undersigned Appellant, who does certify that 
he has served the required number of copies of the enclosed 
Brief, upon the parties entitled to such service by depositing 
a copy of the said same in the United States Mail, first class 
postage pre-paid and addressed as follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
Idaho State Supreme Court 
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Office of the Att. Gen. 
Att: L. LaMont Anderson 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 
83720-0101 
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Dated 
